Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is security provable approach for memory access pattern hiding. However, since ORAM incurs high computational overheads due to repeated shuffles of data blocks in a memory, numerous constructions have been proposed to reduce it. While the computational cost has been improved by these constructions as compared to early ones, it is still expensive from the practical point of view. Specifically, in its application to IoT devices, less computational cost is expected for avoiding high energy consumption. We thus focus on an ORAM construction proposed by Nakano et al. in 2012, which we call the fastest ORAM. The computational cost of this construction is much less than any other conventional ORAM constructions. However, the security has not been analyzed sufficiently, due to the lack of practical security definitions. Therefore, we formulate a new security definition for the fastest ORAM on the basis of the average minentropy, and propose a framework for evaluating the security.
INTRODUCTION
IoT devices usually adopt Low Power Wide Area networks (LPWAN) for sending data and receiving control command from an administrator. In many LP-WAN technologies including LoRa and Sigfox, end devices and servers share secret keys for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. Therefore, it is critical to protect these keys from adversaries for security of services. One of the challenges is that an adversary can easily gain access to IoT devices as they are widely deployed in wide area. Once the adversary obtains the device, one can try to extract the key by using reverse engineering. In the case of LoRaWAN, the master secret key called AppKey is used to derive two session keys called AppSKey and NwkSKey just after the device joins the network. If the adversary can detect which data is accessed during generating the session keys, one can also obtain the master key. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) can be used to mitigate the risk of leaking the secret key. By using ORAM, we can hide which data is actually used during the session key generation even if the adversary has full access to RAM. The drawback of using ORAM is its relatively high demanding in computation, hence high energy consumption. Since many IoT devices are designed for long-term use with batteries, ORAM for IoT devices should be lightweight.
The first constructions of ORAM was introduced by Goldreichis et al. in (Goldreich, 1987; Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 2007) . These ORAM constructions hide memory access patterns by shuffling locations where data are stored on a memory at a certain interval. However, the shuffling process imposes considerable computational overheads. Although there is a rich literature on ORAM constructions devoted to improving the overheads (Pinkas and Reinman, 2010; Shi et al., 2011; Stefanov et al., 2011; Kushilevitz et al., 2012; Williams and Sion, 2012; , their computational overheads are still expensive, which means these constructions are not suitable for practical use. Meanwhile, there is a construction to dramatically improve the overheads, instead of involving information leakage (Nakano et al., 2012) . This construction has been proposed by Nakano et al. , and has the computation overhead of only two times. We call it the fastest ORAM in this paper. The fastest ORAM is expected to be applied to IoT devices, yet there remain concerns on its security. Nakano et al. also provided a new security definition called δ-security for the fastest ORAM. However, this concept was different from that of generic security definitions, such as unpredictability and indisguishability. Analysis with a metric incomparable with well-known ones may engender the degradation of security. We thus revisit the security of the fastest ORAM.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating the fastest ORAM. The contributions of this work are the following:
• We formulate a new security definition based on the average min-entropy for ORAM constructions involving information leakage, which is called lleakage access pattern hiding. This definition is one of the metrics to capture security in the worst case scenario, and comparable with the traditional security definition for ORAM, namely, perfect access pattern hiding. This definition allows us to configure the security level by properly evaluating the amount of the leakage, which means that we can optimize some system specific-parameters used in the fastest ORAM according to security requirements.
• We introduce a practical way to evaluate the amount of information leakage in the fastest ORAM. In order to calculate the amount of the leakage, it is usually required to estimate the probability distribution of memory access patterns. However, the means to the estimation is not known in both cases: theoretical and experimental settings. We thus provide an upper bound of amount of the leakage on the basis of the collision entropy, and give an experimental way to estimate the amount of the leakage from the probability distribution of distance between two access patterns.
• We applied the fastest ORAM to a program of AES, and evaluated the average min-entropy and the amount of information leakage. From the results, we confirm that given a security requirement l, the fastest ORAM can achieve l-leakage access pattern hiding by optimizing its specific parameters.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews early studies on Oblivious RAM (ORAM). Section 3 gives some definitions on ORAM and its security, as well as the definitions of some entropic metrics. Section 4 formulates a new security definition based on the average min-entropy and gives an upper bound related to the new definition. Section 5 proposes a framework for evaluating the security of the fastest ORAM. Section 7 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a security probable approach for memory access pattern hiding. The main ORAM construction consists of two algorithms: an initialization algorithm and an execution algorithm. The initialization algorithm takes data blocks as input and initializes the oblivious structure in a memory containing the data blocks. The execution algorithm compiles each logical access into the virtual access(es). In some ORAM constructions, the initialization algorithm is executed repeatedly at certain interval to ensure the security. The first construction of ORMA has been proposed by Godreich (Goldreich, 1987) , and then extended by Goldreich and Ostrovsky (Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 2007) . They introduced the following two ORAM constructions: Square-Root ORAM, and Hierarchical ORAM. The Square-Root ORAM provides the computational overhead of a square root every access, and the Hierarchical ORAM has polylogarithmic computational complexity. Recently, numerous constructions have been proposed to reduce the overheads (Pinkas and Reinman, 2010; Shi et al., 2011; Stefanov et al., 2011; Kushilevitz et al., 2012; Williams and Sion, 2012; . In particular, a series of ORAM constructions, beginning with the construction of Shi et al. ), adopted binary trees as the underlying structure of a memory. Such Tree-based ORAMs are more efficient than the hierarchical approach, they still have logarithmic computational complexity . The high computational overhead is caused by repeated shuffling processes.
Meanwhile, Nakano et al. have proposed an ORAM construction where the shuffling process is not executed repeatedly. Instead, a client is required to access a memory on a server twice every access. The construction of Nakano et al. has the computational overhead of only two times. While the overheads are dramatically improved, the security has not been analyzed sufficiently. Nakano et al. focused on the repeated accesses to the same data block and provided a security definition for their construction, which is called δ-security. However, they did not mention the relation between δ-security and the definition for security probable ORAM constructions, which means that we cannot compare the security level between different constructions. We thus revisit the security of the construction proposed by Nakano et al., and propose a framework for evaluating the security.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give some definitions on oblivious RAM (ORAM) and its security as well as the definitions of some entropic metrics.
Memory Access Pattern. We consider a clientserver model as a target one (e.g. in terms of computer architecture, a CPU is a client, and a data memory is a server storage). A server has a memory M = {m 1 , . . . , m N } consisting of N data blocks for managing a data array of a client. Given a program R , a client accesses the memory M on the server according to R . Each access is denoted by 3-tuple
. op is one of the following two operations: read or write. When op = read, v is denoted by ⊥, and the client accesses the data block m i ∈ M to get the value stored in it. Otherwise, the client accesses the data block m i to store the value v in it. Let c m i be the address of a data block m i ∈ M on the server.
When a client has an access (op, m i , v), a server observes a = (op, c m i , v). If a client accesses a memory M on a server n times, the access pattern is defined by a sequences of n accesses, a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n . For the sake of simplicity, we below consider an access as a = c m i .
Oblivious RAM. An oblivious RAM (ORAM) construction ORAM is a tuple of the following two algorithms:
Init: Given a memory M , this algorithm initializes the structure of the memory while shuffling data blocks in M . After the initialization process is completed, the memory M is used by the algorithm Exec. In some ORAM constructions, the algorithm Init is executed every T executions of the algorithm Exec for ensuring security.
Exec: Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n be an access pattern that a program R outputs. In order to hide the access pattern a from a server, this algorithm compiles a into another access patten b =
and q ≥ n. We below refer to a and b as a private access pattern and an observable access pattern, respectively.
ORAM Security. The security of ORAM constructions is generally defined as follows: Definition 3.1 (Perfect access pattern hiding (Goodrich et al., 2012) ). Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n be private access patterns.
be observable access patterns of the private access patterns a and a , respectively. An ORAM construction ORAM = (Init, Exec) is perfect access pattern hiding if the observable access patterns b and b are computationally indistinguishable for anyone but the client.
While most of existing ORAM constructions were built with the objective of achieving perfect access pattern hiding, the fastest ORAM construction proposed by Nakano et al. (Nakano et al., 2012) was aimed at dramatically improving the computational overheads instead of allowing information leakage. In the case of constructions involving information leakage, the amount of the leakage is required to be properly evaluated for achieving security requirements. Nakano et al. thus gave a different security definition for such ORAM constructions as follows: Definition 3.2 (δ-length security). Assume that a data block m i ∈ M is accessed twice at i-th access and (i + δ)-th access by a program R , which is called a δ-distance access of m i . An ORAM construction ORAM is δ-length ε-secure if the probability that an adversary identifies any d-distance access in a private access pattern a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is at most ε for every d ≤ δ.
The above security definition was introduced in terms that one of the main challenges of ORAM was to hide repeated accesses to the same data block.
Renyi Entropy. Let X be a random variable on a set X of possible values. The Renyi entropy (Renyi, 1960 ) of X for a real number α ≥ 0 is defined as follows:
(1)
In particular, we refer to the Renyie entropy for α = 2 and the one for α = ∞ as collision entropy and minentropy, respectively. Note that the base of the logarithm is 2 throughout this paper.
Conditional Renyi Entropy. While there are different types of formalization of conditional Renyi entropy, we follow the definition introduced by Fehr et al. (Fehr and Berens, 2014) . Let X and Y be random variables on different sets X and Y of possible values, respectively. The conditional Renyi entropy of X given Y for a real number α ≥ 0 is defined as follows:
In the case of this formalization, the following chain rule holds for all α ≥ 0:
(4) The average min-entropy (Dodis et al., 2008 ) of X given Y is the conditional Renyi entropy for α = ∞, which can be written as follows:
NEW SECURITY DEFINITION
We here revisit the security of ORAM constructions involving information leakage. The security level of such ORAM constructions is adjustable by some system-specific parameters. However, if these parameters are configured on the basis of δ-security, the ORAM construction may not fully satisfy with the other security requirements. This is because δsecurity captures the resistance to a particular attack (which is not the worst case scenario), and the relation between δ-security and the other security definitions is also not obvious. Thus we formulate a new security definition which can capture the worst-case security.
The average min-entropy, formulated by Dodis et al. (Dodis et al., 2008) , is one of practical measures corresponding to the difficulty of guessing or predicting a secret in the worst case scenario. We define lleakage security based on the average min-entropy for ORAM constructions involving information leakage as follows: Definition 4.1 (l-leakage access pattern hiding). Suppose that a memory M consists of N data blocks. Let A n and B q be sets of possible values of a private access pattern a and an observable access pattern b, respectively. Given random variables A and B, on the sets A n and B q , respectively, an ORAM construction ORAM is l-leakage access pattern hiding if the average min-entropyH ∞ (A|B) ≥ − log 1 N n − l. When an ORAM construction is perfect access pattern hiding, the average min-entropy isH ∞ (A|B) = − log 1 N n . Namely, we can configure the security level in the worst case by properly evaluating the amount of the leakage l.
We also introduce the following lemma regarding the average min-entropy, which allow us to easily calculate the amount of information leakage (see Section 5 for details): Lemma 4.1. Given random variables A and B, on sets A n and B q of private access patterns and observable access patterns, respectively, we have the following lower bound of the average min entropyH ∞ (A|B):
Proof. Since max a∈A n Pr
From this inequality and the cain rule of Equation (4),
|B q | = − log 1 N q , and hence we obtain Equation (6).
From Definition 4.1 and Lemma 4.1, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Given a real number l ≥ 0 as a security parameter, when the following inequality holds, an ORAM construction ORAM is l-leakage access pattern hiding:
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
We propose a framework to evaluate security of the fastest ORAM (Nakano et al., 2012) . In this section, we describe the concrete algorithm of the fastest ORAM, and then introduce a practical way to estimate the amount of information leakage in it from the probability distribution of distance between two memory access patterns.
Algorithms of Fastest ORAM
In the fastest ORAM, the Init algorithm is executed once before the Exec algorithm. These algorithms are given as follows:
Init: On loading data blocks to a memory M , the corresponding addresses are permuted. Then dummy data blocks are added. A total of N data blocks are loaded to the memory. This process partitions the memory M into the following two regions: a secure buffer S and an unsecured memory U, consisting of N S data blocks and N u data blocks, respectively, which means N = N S + N U .
The secure buffer S is implemented within client's trusted boundary, and the unsecured memory U is kept in a server. In addition, a history 
Although Theorem 5.1 shows the probability of the adversary detecting the repeated accesses to the same block, the amount of infomation leakage is not clear. In the following, we propose a method to evaluate the leakage.
How to Evaluate l-Leakage
We here provide a practical way to estimate the average min-entropyH ∞ (A|B) for the fastest ORAM by using Equation (6) (A, B) , the marginal probability distribution of A and B, p A,B , is required, yet it is not known to estimate p A,B theoretically or experimentally for the fastest ORAM. For the theoretical estimation, extremely complex calculation of probabilities would be involved. The experimental estimation is not also an easy means because a vast number of samples of access patterns must be collected. We thus consider estimating H 2 (A, B) without the marginal probability distribution p A,B .
Hidano et al. have proposed a way to estimate the collision entropy H 2 (X) of a random variable X on a set X experimentally by using the probability distribution p D of distance d between two elements in the set X (Hidano et al., 2010; Hidano et al., 2012) .
Specifically, the H 2 (X) is given as − log p D (0). In addition, the distance distribution p D can be estimated experimentally with fewer samples of the distance d as compared to the probability distribution of X, denoted as p X , because the number of possible values of the distance is typically far fewer than that of X.
Suppose that the fastest ORAM is applied to a pro- N n for all a ∈ A n ).
From the above results, an lower bound of the av-erage min-entropyH ∞ (A|B) is given as:
Then, an upper bound of amount of information leakage in the fastest ORAM is given as:
Given a real number l ≥ 0 as a security parameter, if l ≤ l up , we say from Theorem 4.1 that the fastest ORAM is l-leakage access pattern hiding.
Estimating Distance Distribution
Let us consider the definition of distance between two memory access patterns and a way to estimate its probability distribution. Edit metrics can be considered to be suitable for the distance. The distance d between two observable access patterns b and b is defined as the smallest number of character insertions and deletions needed for the transformation of b into b . Specifically, we utilize the hamming distance as an edit distance, because the length of any access pattern is the same. Given two observable access patterns b = (b 1 , . . . , b i , . . . , b 2n ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b i , . . . , b 2n ) of length 2n, the Hamming distance between b and b can be written as follows:
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 when b i = b i and value 0 otherwise. We give the following two ways to estimate the distance distribution of the Hamming distance experimentally: parametric approach and non-parametric approach.
Parametric Approach. Assuming that the probability that b i and b i are identical can be represented by θ for any index i, the probability distribution of the Hamming distance d can be written as the following binomial distribution Bi(θ,q):
whereq is the number of meaningful accesses. If there is some correlation between accesses,q may be reduced from 2n. θ andq can be calculated by estimating the values of expectation and variance of the Hamming distance d from its samples DB D . The expectation and the variance of the binomial distribution Bi(θ,q) can be represented by 1 − θ and θ(1−θ) q , respectively. Once the values of θ andq are given, the collision entropy can be easily calculated parametrically as H 2 (B|A) = − log θq. However, in some cases, the probability that b i and b i are identical is different for some index i. In this case, the distance distribution p D cannot be modeled as the Binomial distribution of Equation (12), and there does not exist other suitable parametric approach. Thus, if the probability that b i and b i are identical, the probability cannot be represented by the same parameter θ, the following non-parametric approach should be applied to the estimation.
Non-parametric Approach. Since the probability distribution of the Hamming distance is discrete, it is required to utilize a non-parametric estimator with a discrete kernel function. We thus adopt an estimator with a discrete triangular kernel proposed by Kokonendji et al. (Kokonendji et al., 2007) . Given a data set DB D = {d 1 , . . . ,d i , . . . ,d k(k−1) 2 } of samples of the Hamming distance of Equation (11), the probability distribution can be estimated as:
where q = 2n is the length of an observable access pattern. K α,β,d is a discrete triangular kernel of the order α with the arm β, which is defined as follows:
where P(α, β) = (2β + 1)(β + 1) α − 2 ∑ β j=0 j α , and
Hence, p D (0) can be estimated as:
where w i is the number of samples of the distance whose value is i q . See (Kokonendji et al., 2007) for optimizing the parameters α and β. However, nonparametric approach requires more samples as compared parametric one. Thus the parametric estimation based on the Binomial distribution should be utilized in preference to this non-parametric approach if applicable.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We applied the fastest ORAM to a program of AES, and evaluated the average min-entropy and the amount of information leakage by using the experimental evaluation method provided in Section 5.2.
Setup
In the experiments, we used an unsecured memory with N U = 1424 data blocks. We also used seven kinds of secure buffers of different sizes N S = 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 . The half of data blocks in each secure buffer were used for a history table, i.e. the sizes of the history tables were N H = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 . Under the above conditions, we applied the fastest ORAMs to a program of AES with a 128-bit key, which accesses the memory 3,344 times. Namely, the lengths of the private access pattern and the observable access patterns were n = 3344 and q = 6688, respectively. The following experiments were conducted for each secure buffer, which means we obtained seven kinds of results.
We, first of all, executed the AES program 1,500 times to have samples of observable access patterns. Then, we calculated the Hamming distance of Equation (11) for any pair of samples of observable access patterns, and obtained 1,124,250 samples of the Hamming distance. For estimation of the probability distribution of the Hamming distance, we adopted both of our parametric approach and non-parametric approach provided as Section 5.3. However, we adopted only the parametric approach for the calculation of the collision entropy (See Section 6.2 for the reason). Finally, we evaluated the average min-entropy and the amount of information leakage by using Equations (9) and (10), respectively.
Evaluation Results
Distance Distribution. Figure 1 shows an example of measured and estimated distributions of the Hamming distance between observable access patterns. These distributions are for the fastest ORAM with a secure buffer of the size N S = 32. Both of parametrically and non-parametrically estimated distributions well-fitted the measured values. However, we adopted only the parametric approach for evaluating the average min-entropy and the amount of information leakage, as mentioned in Section 6.1. This is because the sample taking value zero or 1/6688 was not observed. Since the optimized value of the parameter arm for our non-parametric approach was β = 1, such samples were needed for calculating the collision entropy by using Equation (15). For the fastest ORAMs with secure buffers of different sizes, the same property was observed. Therefore, in addition to the collision entropy, all the results shown in Section 6.2 were calculated from parametrically estimated distributions. Figure 1 : The distribution of the Hamming distance between observable access patterns, for the fastest ORAM with a secure buffer of the size N S = 32. The horizontal axis represents a value of the Hamming distance while the vertical axis indicates the probability that the value is taken. The histogram was made from samples of the Hamming distance. The solid line is the distribution estimated by our parametric approach. Parameters of the binomial distribution Bi(θ,q) were given as p = 0.9972 andq = 6447. The dashed line is the distribution estimated by our nonparametric approach. The optimized values of the order and the arm of the discrete triangular kernel were α = 0.0107 and β = 1.
Average Min-entropy and Amount of Information Leakage. Table 1 shows evaluation results on the average min-entropy and the amount of information leakage for the fastest ORAMs with secured buffers of different sizes. We see from the results that there is the possibility the fastest ORAM involves large amount of information leakage, depending on the sizes of the secure buffer and the history table. On the other hand, the information leakage was improved by increasing these sizes. We thus say that by optimizing these sizes on the basis of a required security level, i.e. the leakage l to be allowed, the fastest ORAM can achieve l-leakage access pattern hiding.
In the case where the fastest ORAM is introduced to IoT devices, as mentioned in Section 1, since such devises do not usually have CPUs with large amount of storage, if a secure buffer of larger size is needed for ensuring security, the size is required to be determined at the design stage of the device. Thus, for such IoT devices that the long-term operation is expected, the CPU storage with an enough margin should be equipped in preparation of coming security risks, which allows us to re-configure the security level of the fastest ORAM. 
CONCLUSION
We proposed an evaluation framework for the fastest Oblivious RAM (ORAM) . While the computational overhead is dramatically improved by avoiding repeated shuffles of data blocks in a memory, the security of the fastest ORAM has not been analyzed sufficiently. We thus formulated a new security definition for ORAM constructions involving information leakage on the basis of the average min-entropy, namely, l-leakage access pattern hiding. We also provided a lower bound using the collision entropy for the average min-entropy. Then, for the fastest ORAM we introduced a practical way to evaluate the amount of information leakage from the probability distribution of distance between memory access patterns. Finally, we applied the fastest ORAM to a program of AES, and evaluated the actual amount of information leakage in the fastest ORAM. As a result, we confirmed that by optimizing the size of a secure buffer used for the fastest ORAM, it can achieve l-leakage access pattern hiding for a required security level l. In the future, we will evaluate the amount of the leakage when the fastest ORAM is applied to other types of programs for validating the usefulness of our proposed framework.
